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Abstract 
We study the adoption of environmental management practices in the most polluting in-
dustrial sectors in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia during 
the first years of transition from central planning to market economies. Despite the stick-
iness of long established managerial regimes, 51% of the firms in our sample adopted 
environmental plans and/or established environmental departments in the 1990–1998 
period. Our bivariate analysis reveals that some of the most important forces behind 
adoption are environmental enforcement, export orientation and public disclosure of firm 
environmental performance. 
1. Introduction 
This paper studies corporate environmental management and its determinants 
during transitions from Soviet style socialism toward market economies. Some pro-
ponents of this socialism asserted there would be less pollution in economies not 
driven by profit motives, because planners would (or at least could) take into account 
all costs and benefits of pollution. However, in reality we generally observe the op-
posite. Under central planning the bias towards heavy industry combined with a lack 
of incentives to implement practices that economize on inputs created considerable 
waste and pollution.
1  
We are particularly interested in the  1990–1998 period when the  transition 
was taking its first and most dramatic steps; the fall of the Berlin wall, which marked 
the end the socialist era in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), occurred in 1989. We 
analyze survey data, which were collected in 1998 from 1,719 firms in generally-re-
cognized highly polluting sectors in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania 
* The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee, Allen Blackman, Runar Brännlund, Fredrik Carlsson, 
Åsa Löfgren and Celine Nauges for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Swed-
ish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) to the Environmental Economics Unit, Uni-
versity of Gothenburg, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) support for
the data collection is gratefully acknowledged. We would also like to acknowledge the contributions of 
the researchers at Bulgarian Industrial Association (Bulgaria), TARKI Social Research Group (Hungary),
Environmental Policy Center (Lithuania), Institute of Economics, Polish Academy of Sciences (Poland),
Center for Environmentally Sustainable Economic Policies CESEP (Romania) and, Incoma Research
(Slovakia), who collected the data used in this paper. 
1 There were some areas in which these economies did well from an environmental viewpoint. In the ab-
sence of private cars there were systems of public transport, which in some cases deteriorated during
the transition period, resulting in more mobile-source emissions. Similarly, there were recycling systems
that have now been abandoned. There were also some rural and wilderness areas that were less affected by
pesticides and tourism than today. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5                                              411 
and Slovakia. The survey results suggest that environmental awareness of firms rose 
as market reforms were introduced; indeed the number of firms that according to 
their own reports adopted Environmental Plans (EPs) quadrupled during the first nine 
years of transition and establishment of Environmental Departments (EDs) doubl- 
ed. This study has two objectives. First, we seek to unveil the factors that spurred 
the adoption of Environmental Management Practices (EMPs) in CEE during the tran-
sition. During this period the forces created by the example of Western economies 
had to struggle against the considerable inertia created by a managerial regime that 
lasted for as long as seventy years in Russia and over forty in Eastern Europe. We are 
interested in the strength of the transition forces to bring about social and managerial 
innovation in the  use of natural resources. For instance, the  desire to participate   
in foreign markets, especially at a time when industrial output was declining, could 
have been a strong motivating force in undertaking steps to harmonize with inter-
national norms. Increased civil liberties, such as wider information availability and 
higher public awareness about pollution and health risks, could also have been a de-
termining factor. In fact, it is possible that the existence of civil liberties was one of 
the most crucial differences between “East” and “West.” Environmentalism did not 
develop automatically in the market economies either, but the existence of free press 
and civil liberties provided a  mechanism to channel new information and prefer-
ences, which led to environmental improvements. Finally, the creation of environ-
mental protection agencies that resembled those in western countries could have 
played an important role.
  
Our second aim is to add to the body of literature on environmental man-
agement by explicitly recognizing its multidimensional nature in a  multivariate 
framework. Environmental management entails, by definition, a  series of EMPs 
(Nash and Ehrenfeld, 2001), and different combinations of EMPs might emerge in 
different organizations in response to particular needs and demands. Earlier papers 
that test the determinants of environmental management seem to overlook this as-
pect. Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) study the determinants of one EMP, environ-
mental plans, in Canada. Dasgupta et al. (2000) analyzed data from Mexican industry 
and look at the influences of different factors on separate EMPs and on an index 
defined by the number of EMPs adopted. A similar approach is used by Henriques 
and Sadorsky (2007) to analyze Hungarian firms. Khanna and Anton (2002) and 
Anton et al. (2004) also define a count of the number of EMPs to analyze U.S. firm 
data.
2  Instead of collapsing environmental management into an index, we study 
the joint adoption decision of two key EMPs, namely EPs and EDs.  
We utilize a bivariate probit model that allows comparisons between the de-
terminants of EP and ED adoption and some possible interactions between these two 
decisions. The results show that those firms that face higher enforcement and public 
disclosure of their environmental performance, are more likely to adopt EPs and/or 
EDs. Public disclosure referees to whether a firm appeared in reports about industrial 
pollution in the media. Export oriented firms and larger firms as measured by num-
ber of employees are also more prone to adoption, but the effects are smaller than 
those associated with enforcement and public disclosure. The findings on enforce-
ment and firm size are consistent with studies carried out in countries with estab-
2 Dasgupta et al. (2000) and Khanna et al. (2004) also study the impact of environmental management on 
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lished market economies (Dasgupta et al., 2000; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et 
al., 2004). Regarding export orientation, our findings are in line with Neumayer and 
Perkins (2004), a cross-country study that reports that exports of goods and services 
per capita are highly correlated with ISO14000 certifications, a well-known inter-
national voluntary standard for environmental management. In a related paper, Hen-
riques and Sadorsky (2007) find similar results for market pressure and firm size.
3 To 
the best of our knowledge, no other studies have attempted to relate information on 
disclosure of environmental events and firms’ environmental management.
4 This 
finding should be interpreted in terms of increased public awareness and public pres-
sure that are not related to other variables we control for in the analysis. Levels of 
private and foreign private ownership were expected to be important, but did not 
appear significant. 
The factors affecting EP and/or ED adoption appear to be the same: enforce-
ment, public disclosure, exports, and firm size. This is despite the fact that in our sam-
ple a fairly large proportion of EP adopters are not ED adopters, suggesting that some 
firms might see these as alternatives. However, the bivariate approach reveals that 
enforcement and public disclosure are more important in explaining the ED adoption 
decision, whereas export orientation and firm size perform better at explaining EP 
adoption. Notably, once a firm has decided to adopt an ED, then additional increases 
in enforcement or disclosure do not lead to EP implementation. 
We begin in Section 2 by discussing the scope of environmental management 
in transition economies. In Section 3 we describe the data used in the analysis, while 
Section 4 introduces the methodological approach. Section 5 presents the results and 
Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of the findings. 
2. Literature on Environmental Management Practices and Transition 
During the socialist period CEE countries were known for severe pollution 
(Satre-Ahlander, 1994). Coal was the primary source of energy, providing 40% (Hun-
gary) to 90% (Poland) of the total (Hughes, 1991; Chandler, 2000, p. 139; Carter, 
1993). Industry, power and heating plants tended to be located near coal reserves in 
order to reduce transport costs and given the low quality of coal reserves, pollution 
was a severe threat to both people and ecosystems in these areas. Water quality was 
also a serious issue. Over 80% of the East German rivers were considered highly 
polluted and Czechoslovakia left almost half of its sewage untreated in 1980 (World 
Bank, 1994). In Lithuania, only the capital Vilnius had basic wastewater treatment. 
Poland’s Teja River contained 65 times more bacteria than recommended by the World 
Health Organization (Hughes, 1991; Wilczynski, 1990; Carter, 1993; Chandler, 2000). 
The CEE countries emitted much more pollution per unit of GDP and per 
person than OECD countries. For example, in 1980 the planned economies in Europe 
averaged 13 times more particulates per capita than EU countries and three times 
more wastewater emissions (OECD, 1999). SO2 emissions per capita were on aver-
3 That study uses Hungarian firm-level data from a more advanced stage of transition, namely year 2003,
when Hungary signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Union. 
4 A number of papers have reported that releases of information about the environmental performance of 
firms do produce reductions in actual emissions (Konar and Cohen, 1997; Foulon et al., 2002; García et
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age 75% more than the EU in 1990 (UNFCCC, 2008). Compared with Western Eu-
rope, CEE countries produced 30% more SO2 per unit of energy consumed (Wilczyn-
ski, 1990; Sharma, 1997, p. 82).  
Environmental management systems that are common today hardly existed in 
the planned economies of the time. In modern market economies, on the other hand, 
the use of EMPs was already widespread in 1990. According to one survey from that 
time of 400 senior managers of international firms, almost 80% reported that they 
utilized such methods (McKinsey & Company, 1991). We also see a broad range of 
EMPs, including the development of environmental plans, establishment of environ-
mental departments, adoption of environmental audit programs and certificates such 
as ISO 14000, waste minimization and pollution prevention programs and internal 
monitoring of air and water pollution emissions. It is conceivable that these steps are 
complementary and that for instance the build-up of an environmental department 
leads to auditing and pollution prevention programs, which in turn necessitate a fur-
ther strengthening of environmental departments. It is, however, also conceivable 
that they partly are substitutes, in particular if a firm views this as an “image issue”. 
If firms, for example, manage to get a certification, they may feel they do not have to 
make additional improvements since they already acquired sufficiently green cre-
dentials for marketing or other purposes. 
This latter possibility is, however, limited by the fact that many of these 
programs have their own logic. They lead to people being hired, trained, and focused 
on environmental issues and their interests have a tendency to become a force in their 
own right. Some programs are also quite formal and abide by rules set by outside 
organizations. This applies, for instance, to the set of measures necessary for Inter-
national Standards Organization 14000 series certification. An ISO 14001 certifica-
tion requires documentation of environmental planning, monitoring and assessment. 
In addition to being a potentially useful tool for management, it is assumed to signal 
commitment and quality, which may explain its value to firms (Boiral and Sala, 1998; 
Clapp, 2001). For example, it has been found that EU importers put great weight on 
ISO 14001 certification when choosing trade partners, (see Bellesi et al, 2005). King 
and Lenox (2001) suggest that cost savings may be a separate factor since US firms 
with ISO 140001 certification tend to also have ISO 9001, which addresses product 
quality.  
There is a substantial literature that examines the determinants of EMPs. This 
includes Henriques and Sadorsky (1996), who study the existence of environmental 
plans in Canadian firms, the role of ownership structure and the existence of outside 
pressure from consumers, investors, community, and government. Anton et al. (2004) 
also find that consumers, investors and even competitors may prompt environmental 
action. Another study showing the importance of good relations with stakeholders, 
especially regulators and consumers is Benito and Benito (2005), who find that 
the main drivers of adoption are more effective regulatory compliance and cost sav-
ings. Khanna and Anton (2002) show that important factors are the threat of tougher 
regulation and fear of liabilities. They also note that EMPs are not necessarily alter-
natives to regulation, since they are usually undertaken against a backdrop of solid 
regulation that creates adoption incentives.  
These studies all look at mature market economies. Examining economies in 
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drivers of firm behaviour. During major economic transitions dramatic changes in 
fundamental firm-level behavioural parameters, like production technology, customer 
base, regulatory pressures and even motivations for production occur. Examples of 
major contextual changes that occurred during the 1990s in CEE countries include 
the creation of more secure property rights, development of functioning markets  
and creation of competitive business environments, all of which may be expected to 
strongly enhance incentives for efficient production. Brown et al. (2006) find, for 
example, that privatization is associated with 15 to 50% increases in productivity in 
Romanian manufacturing and 8% to 28% in Hungary. Collins and Harris (2002) ana-
lyze a sample of UK metal manufacturing plants and find that foreign-owned plants 
are more likely to invest in pollution abatement and invest more than purely domes-
tic plants. Sterner (1990) finds in Mexican cement manufacturing that cooperative 
ownership is superior, but foreign multinational ownership could be either more or 
less energy efficient than local ownership. Dasgupta et al. (2000) analyze Mexican 
firms as well and report that formal regulation and public trading of a firm’s stock are 
associated with adoption of EMPs.  
One of the  most striking results of the  transition from planning to market 
economies in CEE countries was the internationalization of previously isolated econ-
omies.
5 This opening up could have important ramifications for corporate environ-
mental management. For example, in a survey of 1,000 potential foreign corporate 
investors in CEE countries, over three-quarters said they utilized headquarter country 
environmental management standards when they were stricter than those in their 
countries of investment (Klavens and Zamparutti, 1995; Environment for Europe, 
1994).  
Similarly, increased exports to market economies could also spur better envi-
ronmental management, including adoption of EMPs. Quality standards are often 
higher in western markets and can typically only be met by using improved technol-
ogies mediated by EMPs (Andonova, 2003). Consumers in many of these countries 
also prefer products manufactured using environmentally benign methods, but have 
little direct information on these processes. While requiring some proof of environ-
mental management may be popular as a convenient non-tariff trade barrier, firms 
with higher foreign trade shares may also adopt EMPs to signal green production 
methods (Bellesi et al., 2005).  
Finally, freedom of speech, press and association may have fundamental ef-
fects on the adoption of EMPs. We know that environmental management in indus-
trialized countries is the result of interactions between members of society who place 
different weights on environmental quality and that the effects of open media and 
existence of civil liberties are very important for resolving these differences (Sachs, 
1995). We also know from the literature on environmental information that making 
information available can have significant effects on firms’ emissions levels (Konar 
and Cohen, 1997; Foulon et al., 2002; García et al., 2007).  
While little information on pollution was available before 1989, during the eco-
nomic transitions such information became widely available as most CEE countries 
5 CEE countries experienced significant foreign direct investment (estimated at USD 70 billion) flowing 
into the region in the 1990s. Export earnings averaged almost 9% during 1993–98, with the share of ex-
ports to the West increasing to 67% by 1999 (World Bank, 2000).  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5                                              415 
began to enforce the public's right to know about the environment. Under socialism 
there were also very few independent environmental advocacy groups, but even by 
1997 the  Regional Environment Centre headquartered in Budapest had identified 
3,000 NGOs advocating for improved environmental quality in the region. Further-
more, official regulatory authorities, such as ministries of environment, environ-
mental protection agencies and inspectorates were strengthened during the transition 
period. Monitoring systems were also put in place and though by no means perfect, 
the produced data were increasingly used for enforcement purposes.  
3. Data  
In order to identify the key drivers of transition-period adoption of key EMPs, 
we analyze data from firms located in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Roma-
nia and Slovakia.
6 These countries represent a wide variety of cultures and transition 
experiences, with Hungary and Poland considered the most advanced in terms of 
private sector development, followed by Lithuania and Slovakia and then Romania 
and Bulgaria. The data were gathered in 1998 by professional research firms or insti-
tutes that either had substantial experience in environmental economics research or 
specialized in survey implementation. The sample was stratified to include only firms 
operating in industries that are generally highly polluting and therefore likely to face 
environmental management challenges. Our analysis covers animal raising, mining, 
power and manufacturing sectors.  
Our focus is on the establishment of Environmental Plans (EPs) and Environ-
mental Departments (EDs) during the first nine years of transition and we take EP 
and ED adoption as dependent variables in the  analysis. The  survey asked firms 
whether they had an EP or an ED in 1998 and the year(s) of initiation. Before 1990, 
relatively few firms had EPs and around 51% of the firms adopted either EPs or EDs 
between 1990 and 1998.
7 An Environmental Plan (EP) could well be based on EMAS 
or EMS but actually in the questionnaire was more broadly conceived. An EP was 
any document or plan that was defined by management as an environmental plan. 
This treatment reflects the realities of the transition setting when relatively few firms 
had harmonized their EMSs with Western Europe and a variety of western-style EM 
requirements were just emerging. Table 1 shows that adoption of EPs increased by 
a factor of 4 and the number of firms that established EDs doubled during 1990– 
–1998. 
Table 2 presents joint EP and ED adoption frequencies for both the full sam-
ple and a restricted sample that excludes firms that had adopted either an ED or EP 
before 1990. The first panel (all firms) gives a general picture of the adoption levels 
for 1998: almost 40% of the firms did not have an ED or an EP, about one third  
of the firms had either an ED or an EP and around 30% had both. Roughly 60% of 
6 The data were collected within a project run by the Harvard Institute for International Development and 
are described in somewhat greater detail in Bluffstone and Sterner (2006). That study is more of a general 
description of environmental management concerns in Eastern Europe, but also includes an exploratory 
analysis of EMP adoption. 
7 The survey also asked about the possible presence of other EMPs in 1998, such as the existence of a func-
tioning water treatment plant or the presence of internal monitoring. No information on the year of ini-
tiation was however requested, thus it is not possible to attribute their implementation to social planning 
forces (before 1990) or to the transition forces (after 1990).  416                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
 
the firms that had an ED also had an EP, but the fact that one third only had one of 
them suggest that some firms might see them as alternatives. We will therefore look 
more closely at how these decisions are interrelated.  
Our interest is mainly in explaining the determinants of ED and EP implemen-
tation during 1990 to 1998, which were the first eight years of the transition period. 
This is therefore the time period for all explanatory variables used in our econometric 
models and we limit our sample (N = 1,376) to firms that had adopted neither an EP 
nor an ED before 1990.
8 
Table 3 presents a description of the explanatory variables, their role in the ana-
lysis and some basic statistics.
9 The top of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for our 
explanatory variables of primary interest. The first set of variables captures the exter-
nal market, social and regulatory pressures that were discussed in the  Section  2. 
The ownership structure of the firm is included as a proxy for investor pressure and 
corporate culture and is captured by two variables: the proportion of private owner-
ship (Private owner) and a dummy (Foreign owner) for firms that had some foreign 
ownership. Two-thirds of the total capital stock was owned by private shareholders 
and around 15% of firms were partially or totally owned by foreign investors.  
The dummy variable Disclosure is an indicator of public awareness and public 
pressure, taking the value of one if the public was informed about firms’ environ-
mental performances and emissions of major pollutants during the 1990–1998 period. 
This category includes reports in local news papers and the media. About a quarter of 
Table 1  Environmental Plan (EP) and Environmental Department (ED) Adoption 






















Table 2  Cross Tabulation EP and ED Adoption Observed in 1998 
All firms (N = 1719)  Without firms that had adopted either ED or EP 
before 1990 (N = 1376) 
  ED = 0  ED = 1  Total    ED = 0  ED = 1  Total 


































8 Some firms reported EMS implementation as far back as 1972 and this raises questions on the reliability 
of such data. See section 5 for further details on EMS implementation prior to 1990. 
9 Manufacturing firms represent 85% of the sample while 7.3% of the firms belong to mining, 8.9% to power 
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our sample were subject to such scrutiny. Finally, three dummy variables, Warnings, 
Orders, and Fines, capture regulatory pressure during the  same period. Although 
the proportion of firms that were subject to each type of enforcement action appears 
fairly similar, it was not the same firms that were subject to each action and cor-
relations between the three enforcement dummies are relatively low, ranging from 
0.21 between Orders and Fines to 0.29 between Warnings and Orders.  
The variable Age refers to the age of most firm capital equipment as of 1998. 
The average year of installation was 1972, indicating that substantial upgrading was 
needed. Our hypothesis is that firms with older capital had organizations that were 
more rooted in the communist times and would therefore oppose the implementation 
of new strategies; those that had upgraded technology probably also found it less cost-
ly to simultaneously implement EMPs. The variable Employees denotes the average 
number of employees in the 1990–1998 period. Since the costs of coordination in 
large organizations are expected to be high, a plan of action, such as an EP, and 
a coordinating body, such as an ED, could reduce such costs. Also, firms can exploit 
labor economies of scale in the development of EMPs.  
The bottom of Table 3 presents a set of country control variables. The exist-
ence of EDs varied widely across countries with less than 15% prevalence among 
Hungarian, Lithuanian and Polish firms versus 45% and 78% in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania. Thus, a need to control for possible country-specific effects seems apparent. 
Cross-country variance in EPs was a bit smaller, however, with one-third to one-half 
of firms having environmental plans. 
Table 3  Independent Variables: Definition and Descriptive Statistics
(N = 1376) 
Variable  Description  A proxy for  Mean  SD 
Private  Proportion of private (national 
& foreign) ownership  Shareholders pressure  66.4883  39.7687 
Foreign owner  1 if firm had foreign ownership  Shareholders pressure 
(FDI)    0.1418    0.3489 
Export share  Proportion exports of total 
production 
Product market  
pressure  24.4574  35.1378 
Disclosure  Public was informed about  
firms pollution 
Public awareness and 
public pressure    0.2290    0.4204 
Warnings  1 if firm received any warnings  Government regulatory 
pressure    0.1672    0.3733 
Orders  1 if firm received any order  
to reduce pollution 
Government regulatory 
pressure    0.1061    0.3081 
Fines  1 if firm was  fined  Government regulatory 
pressure    0.1410    0.3482 
Age  Age of most firm equipment  Capital quality  26.1265  19.2722 
Employees  Number of employees (log)  Employment    5.4514    1.4083 
Bulgaria  1 if located in Bulgaria  Country control    0.1810    0.3852 
Hungary  1 if located in Hungary  Country control    0.1934    0.3951 
Lithuania  1 if located in Lithuania  Country control    0.1374    0.3444 
Poland  1 if located in Poland  Country control    0.1745    0.3797 
Romania  1 if located in Romania  Country control    0.3090    0.4622 
Slovakia  1 if located in Slovakia  Country control    0.0043    0.0659 
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4. Empirical Approach  
Our empirical approach is based on a latent regression. Firm i’s net benefit of 
adopting a given environmental management practice j can be represented as: 
                                        
* π βε ′ = + ij j i ij x
                                               (1) 
where xi are observable firm characteristics and other factors that determine the pro-
fitability, 
* πij , of the adoption decision, and εij is an unobserved random component. 
In practice, 
* πij  is unobservable. What we observe is a dummy variable defined by: 


















It is thus assumed that adoption occurs if it is profitable to the firm. We intend 
to explain the establishment of not only one but two EMPs. Note that Table 2 re-
presents a  joint distribution between the  variables ED and EP and that a  positive 
correlation between the two is apparent. In principle it is natural to think that at least 
some of the observed and unobserved determinants of different EMPs are similar. 
We thus implement a bivariate probit model where the two decisions are jointly es-
timated and are allowed to be correlated (Green, 2003). The model is characterized 
by:  
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where () , εε iEP iED is distributed as a bivariate normal with zero means, unit variances 
and correlation ρ between its two components. Since we do not have strong a priori 
hypotheses on different determinants of ED and EP adoption, the vector of expla-
natory variables xi in (1) is the same in both equations. There are four types of obser-
vations in our sample, ( , ) (0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1) → EP ED . Using the bivariate normal 
distribution, probabilities for each one of these events are constructed and incor-
porated in a log-likelihood function for estimation. If we recall that marginal, joint 
and conditional probabilities can be defined within a multivariate framework, in our 
bivariate case the associated marginal probability for ED adoption is:  
                                    11 Pr 1 ( ) Φβ == ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ii ED x             (2) 
where  1() Φ ⋅ is the cumulative univariate normal distribution function. The joint pro-
babilities associated with ED adoption are: 
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where  2() Φ ⋅ is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function. Marginal and 
joint probabilities can be used to calculate the following conditional probabilities: 
    21 2 21 2
21 / 2
12
(, , ) ( )
Pr( 1 1)
() (1 )
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             (4b) 
Equations (2), (3a, 3b) and (4a, 4b) can also be defined for EP and will have 
similar forms (Christofides et al., 1997). Note that when the correlation coefficient is 
zero, then conditional probabilities reduce to marginal probabilities and joint proba-
bilities equal the product of the marginal probabilities. 
The model described above resembles a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
model where the dependent variables are dummy variables. SUR models are usually 
justified by higher efficiency relative to single equation techniques where possible 
correlation across error terms is not exploited. It has however been established that 
gains in efficiency are reduced when the sets of independent variables are the same 
across equations, as they are in our case (Wooldrige, 2001).  
We are particularly interested in the estimation of the correlation coefficient 
itself, since it provides evidence on possible similarities (or dissimilarities) of unob-
servable ED and EP determinants. Marginal, joint and conditional probabilities of 
the estimated bivariate distribution give further insights on firm motives to adopt ED 
and/or EP and, most importantly, the level of interdependence.  
5. Results 
Table 4 presents marginal effects for marginal and joint probabilities based on 
full information maximum likelihood estimates of the  bivariate probit model for   
ED and EP adoption. For the continuous variables the estimates measure the increase 
in the probability of observing a given event due to a partial change in independent 
variables. For dummy variables, the marginal effects are calculated as differences in 
the probabilities of observing adoption for the two possible values. All marginal ef-
fects are calculated at sample means. The cross tabulation in the bottom right panel 
of the table relates predicted outcomes to actual events using a threshold probability 
value of 0.5. The estimated model correctly predicts 84% of the outcomes. The corre-
lation between the two random terms is positive, large and highly significant im-
plying that some of the unobserved determinants of ED and EP adoption could be 
the same and that there are complementarities between these EMPs.
10  
10 Frequency calculations based on Table 6 (in Appendix) reveal that firms that adopted EPs and EDs 
before 1990 have somewhat higher probabilites to adopt the other EMPs during the period 1990–98. When 
including control dummies in our specification, we find severe collinearity with the other independent var-
iables. Note, however, that the bivariate model explicitly tests for contemporaneous EP-ED correlation and 
this is exploited in the estimation. The estimated correlation coefficient is positive and significantly dif-
erent from zero, which underscores the presumption that EP and ED are interlinked. Although this is not
a test for the influence of prior implementation it suggests that such a possibility exists.  420                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
 
5.1 Marginal Probabilities of EP and ED Adoption 
The first two columns of Table 4 present marginal effects for marginal proba-
bilities where the decisions to adopt an ED and an EP are considered separately (see 
equation 2). These marginal effects take the signs and significance levels from the re-
gression estimates, which have been omitted for the sake of brevity. Apart from some 
country controls, similar sets of variables appear consistently significant and with 
the same signs in both sets of parameter estimates. Although the warnings and fines 
dummy variables are both significant in the ED equation, neither appears significant 
in the EP equation. The third measure of government enforcement, the orders dummy 
variable, is significant in both models. The fact that not only the observed, but also 
the unobserved factors that determine EP and ED adoption are alike is an interesting 
finding, because not all EP adopters are ED adopters and vice versa. Apparently, firms 
Table 4  Marginal effects on Marginal and Joint Probabilities
Variable  Δ Prob [ED = 1] 
Δx 
Δ Prob [EP = 1] 
Δx 
Δ Prob [ED = 1, EP = 1] 
Δx 













Exportshare  0.0013 ** 
(0.0006) 





d  0.1052 *** 
(0.0407) 












d  0.1279 ** 
(0.0631) 









0.0509 *  
(0.0290) 















































N                1375  Cross tabulation of EP and ED 
Fitted values in brackets  
Rho            0.5280 ***
                 (0.0444)    ED = 0  ED = 1 
Log likelihood  









Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at a 10% level; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Marginal effects for dummy variables are measured at the means of other variables whereas 
marginal effects for continuous variables are given at the means of all variables. Superscript d indicates 
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with similar characteristics that are faced with similar external pressure undertake 
either or both strategies. Firms with larger numbers of employees that are more ex-
port-oriented and that are faced with public disclosure requirements and higher en-
forcement are more likely to adopt EMPs. Age and ownership variables appear non- 
-significant in the regression results and throughout the analysis.  
Regarding the magnitude of marginal effects for marginal probabilities (first 
two columns in Table 4), enforcement and disclosure have a strong effect on ED adop-
tion, while employment and exports influence EP adoption. For example, the sum of 
the three marginal effects for warnings, orders and fines is 0.39 for ED adoption and 
only 0.16 for EP adoption. The existence of warnings increases the probability of ED 
adoption by 17.9%, whereas the presence of fines increases the likelihood of having 
such institutions by 8.4%. No significant effects of the fines and warnings dummy 
variables are found on EP adoption.  
The marginal effects associated with orders to reduce emissions are similar  
in both models at around 12%. Those firms whose environmental performances are 
publicly disclosed increase the probability of ED (EP) adoption by 10.5% (7.4%), but 
an increase in the proportion of exported products increases the probability of ED 
(EP) adoption by only 0.1% (0.2%). A percentage point increase in the number of 
employees is reflected in a 2.7% and a 3.4% increase in the probability of ED adop-
tion and EP adoption, respectively. 
The third column of Table 4 shows the marginal effects on the (joint) proba-
bility of firms implementing both an ED and an EP. The determinants of environ-
mental management reveal themselves with high accuracy in this set of results 
compared to those of marginal probabilities shown in the  first two columns. All 
determining variables except fines are significant at a 1% level when we analyze 
the firms that have both EP and ED.  
Table 5 presents the marginal effects on conditional probabilities. The results 
on marginal probabilities show that enforcement, disclosure, export, and employ-
ment seem to explain both EDs and EPs. The results on conditional probabilities 
provide an indication of the relative importance of these four factors at explaining 
each of these EMPs. The first panel of Table 5 shows that, given a constant EP adop-
tion status, employment and export shares do not increase the probability of ED 
adoption whereas disclosure and warnings do have a positive and significant effect. 
Note also that other enforcement variables – the orders and fines dummies – are posi-
tive and have relatively small standard errors, although not small enough to make 
them significant at 10% levels.  
It is found that ceteris paribus, employment and export shares increase the prob-
ability of EP adoption whereas disclosure and enforcement actions have no effect. 
We also find that if a firm is faced with an enforcement action and it already has 
an ED or does not have an ED and decides not to adopt one, then the likelihood of 
establishing an EP is not increased.  
We have put quite some effort into making sure that the covariates used in 
the analysis are exogenous. For instance, although available to us, we did not use 
data on manager perceptions of the factors that could possibly induce EMP adoption. 
Neither did we use information on early adopters (those firms that implement- 
ed EMPs before 1990) since our covariates are defined for the 1990–1998 period. 422                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
 
The types of variables that we did use are, however, interlinked in complex ways and 
we acknowledge that our estimates could still suffer bias due to some endogeneity. 
For instance, we find that facilities that faced higher enforcement and whose pollu-
tion levels were publicly disclosed were more likely to have EDs and/or EPs. How-
ever, it could be true that firms that adopt EMPs might subsequently face less pressure 
from authorities, because EMPs signal compliance. As compliers, they might then be 
less likely to appear in the news as heavy polluters. This line of reasoning would ac-
tually still strengthen our general conclusions, because it would just imply that our 
results underestimate the effects of enforcement and disclosure.  
6. Conclusions 
The findings in this paper suggest that a variety of factors and not just the fall 
in industrial output that occurred during the early 1990s might have lead to the im-
provements in ambient quality in CEE countries.
11 We know that changes in produc-
tion processes and the implementation of abatement technologies, which are arguably 
results of managerial strategies, could also lead to emissions reductions.
12 In fact, 
42% of the firms in our sample adopted EPs and/or EDs during the 1990–1998 pe-
riod. In this paper, we delve into the determinants of these EMPs. 
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Our results show that the observed determinants of EP and ED adoption are 
practically the same and that the unobserved determinants of these two EMPs are 
highly correlated. These findings, although not necessarily surprising, are not directly 
evident from the data where a high proportion of EP adopters did not adopt EDs and 
vice versa. The factors that appear to drive both EP and ED adoption are: (a) enforce-
ment activities, which seemed to increase during the transition thanks to the creation 
or strengthening of environmental management agencies; (b)  public disclosure of 
environmental performances of firms; c) export-orientation; and finally, (d) firm size. 
Factors that were expected to play a role but did not appear significant in the analy-
sis were private and foreign private ownership (as opposed to public ownership) and 
plant age.  
Looking deeper we find that enforcement and disclosure are more important 
for explaining the build up of environmental bureaucracies (ED), whereas employ-
ment and export orientation are more important at explaining environmental plans 
(EP). One possible interpretation might be that the former is the more “Soviet” or, in 
this context, “old-fashioned” response, which is mainly triggered by variables such as 
regulatory policies and disclosure, while the adoption of environmental plans is a more 
“modern” or market based response and thus more sensitive to variables such as ex-
port orientation. From a policy viewpoint, perhaps the most important new know-
ledge to emerge is that enforcement is a strong and positive determinant of both EPs 
and EDs. The implication of this is that market reform and deregulation are not nec-
essarily going to lead to an automatic enthusiasm for environmental management; 
there is still an important role for regulators. 
11 The economic transitions in CEE countries greatly reduced stationary source air and water pollution. For 
example, in the Slovak Republic emissions of particulate matter (an important air pollutant) by stationary
sources declined by 80% during the eight years between 1990 and 1997. SO2 emissions fell by over 60% 
and NOx declined by 45% during the same period (Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic, 1998).
In Lithuania, for example, industrial emissions of chrome and copper declined by 65–70% during 1989–
–1994 alone. Biological oxygen demand in surface waters fell by about 90% during the 1990s (Ministry of 
Environment of Lithuania, 2001). 
12 A number of studies have shown that firms with EMPs produce less pollution and are more likely to
comply with environmental legislation. Anton et al. (2004) found that firms with more comprehensive en-
vironmental management systems had lower toxic releases per unit of sales. Newbold (2006) found that 
adoption of EMPs in the Chilean mining sector improves the environmental performance of firms. Nash 
and Ehrenfeld (2001) cite several examples where adoption of EMPs likely improved environmental per-
formance in US firms. They also note that when EMPs conflict with other goals, firms may drop or revise
them.  424                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
APPENDIX 
 
Table 6  Cross Tabulation EP and ED Adoption. Complete Sample 
  ED = 0  ED 1990-1998 = 1  ED prior 1990 = 1  Total 































  (100%) 
 
REFERENCES 
Aden J, Kyu-Hong A, Rock M (1999): What is driving the Pollution Abatement Expenditure Behav-
ior of Manufacturing Plants in Korea? World Development, 27(7):1203–1214. 
Andonova L (2003): Openness and the Environment in Central and Eastern Europe: Can Trade and 
Foreign Investment Stimulate Better Environmental Management in Enterprises? Journal of En-
vironment and Development, 12(2):177–204. 
Anton WRQ, Deltas G, Khanna M (2004): Incentives for Environmental Self-Regulation and Im-
plications for Environmental Performance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
48(1):632–654. 
Arora S, Cason TN (1996): Why do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Under-
standing Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program. Land Economics, 74(4):413–432. 
Bellesi F, Lehrer D, Tal A (2005): Comparative Advantage: The Impact of ISO 14001 Environ-
mental Certification on Exports. Environmental Science & Technology, 39(7):1943–1953. 
Benito J, Benito O (2005): An Analysis of the Relationship between Environmental Motivations and 
ISO 14001 Certification. British Journal of Management, 16(2):133–148. 
Bluffstone R, Sterner T (2006): Explaining Environmental Management in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Comparative Economic Studies, 48(4):619–640. 
Boiral O, Sala J (1998): Environmental Management: Should Industry Adopt ISO 14001? Business 
Horizons, 41(1):57–64. 
Brown JD, Earle J, Telegdy A (2006): The Productivity Effects of Privatization: Longitudinal Es-
timates from Hungary, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. Journal of Political Economy, 114(1):61–99. 
Clapp J (2001) ISO Environmental Standards: Industry’s Gift to a Polluted Globe or the Developed 
World’s Competition-Killing Strategy? In: Stokke OS, Thommessen ØB (Eds): Yearbook of 
International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/2002. Earthscan Publications, 
London, 27–33. 
Carter FW, Turnock D (1993): Environmental Problems in Eastern Europe. Routledge, London. 
Collins A, Harris R (2002): Does Plant Ownership Affect the Level of Pollution Abatement Ex-
penditure? Land Economics, 78(2):171–189. 
Chandler WU (2000): Energy and Environment in Transition Economies. Westview Press, Oxford 
and Boulder, Co. 
Christofides LN, Stengos T, Swidinsky R (1997): On the calculation of Marginal Effects in the Bi-
variate Probit model. Economic Letters, 54(3):203–208  
Dasgupta S, Hettige H, Wheeler D (2000): What Improves Environmental Compliance? Evidence 
from Mexican Industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 39(1):39–66.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5                                              425 
García JH, Sterner T, Afsah S (2007): Public disclosure of industrial pollution: The PROPER 
approach for Indonesia? Environment and Development Economics, 12(6):739–756.  
Henriques I, Sadorsky P (1996): The Determinants of an Environmentally Responsive Firm: 
An Empirical Approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30(3):381–395. 
Hughes G (1991): Are the Costs of Cleaning up Eastern Europe Exaggerated? Economic Reform 
and the Environment. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 7(4):106–136.  
King A, Lenox MJ (2001): Lean and Green? An Empirical Examination of the Relationship between 
Lean Production and Environmental Performance. Productions and Operations Management, 
10(3):244–257. 
Khanna M, Anton WRQ (2002): Corporate Environmental Management: Regulatory and Market- 
-Based Incentives. Land Economics, 78(4):539–558. 
Klavens J, Zamparutti A (1995): Foreign Direct Investment and Environment in Central and 
Eastern Europe: A Survey. World Bank Publications, Washington DC. 
McKinsey and Company (1991): The Corporate Response to the Environmental Challenge, Sum-
mary Report. Amsterdam. 
Nash J, Ehrenfeld JR (2001) Factors that Shape EMS Outcomes in Firms. In: Coglianese G, Nash J 
(Eds): Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? 
RFF Press, Washington, DC, 61–81  
Neumayer E, Perkings R (2004): What Explains the Uneven Take-Up of ISO 14001 at the Global 
Level? A Panel-Data Analysis. Environment and Planning, A 36:823–839  
OECD (1999): Environment in the Transition to a Market Economy: Addressing Environmental 
Challenges in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development. Paris. 
Newbold J (2006): Chile’s Environmental Momentum: ISO 14001 and the Large-Scale Mining In-
dustry – Case Studies from the State and Private Sector. Journal of Cleaner Production, 14(3):248–
261. 
Sachs J (1995): Economies in Transition: Some Aspects of Environmental Policy. Environment 
Discussion Paper #1, Harvard Institute for International Development, Boston MA. 
Sharma S (1997): Restructuring Eastern Europe: The Microeconomics of the Transition Process. 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, UK. 
Sätre-Åhlander A (1994): Environmental Problems in the Shortage Economy. Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing Ltd, Cheltenham, UK. 
Sterner T (1990): Ownership, Technology and Efficiency: A comparison of domestic, multinational 
and cooperative enterprises in the Mexican Cement Industry. Journal of Comparative Economics, 
14(2):286–300. 
UNFCC (2008): National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990–2006. United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Poznan. 
Wilczynski P (1990): Environmental Management in Centrally-Planned Non-Market Economies of 
Eastern Europe. Research Paper, World Bank Publications, Washington, DC. 
Wooldridge JM (2001): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA. 
World Bank (1994): Environment for Europe: Environmental Action Plan for Central and Eastern 
Europe. World Bank Publications, Washington DC.  